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Abstract
We study the positionality of trigger strategies Nash equilibria σ for the N -player SCAR games
ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) (with N ≥ 3). Our study is exhaustive with respect to types of graphs G, initial states
s0 and values of N, γ, ε. We conclude that in the majority of cases, profiles σ are nonpositional.
Whenever σ are positional a key role is played by paths and the ε, γ values (especially whether
ε > 0 or not). A crucial concept in our analysis is the state cop number, which is first introduced in
the current paper.
1 Introduction
In [3] we introduce the game of selfish cops and adversarial robber (SCAR) denoted by ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε).
This can be seen as an N -player variant of the classic, two-player cops and robber (CR) game [4, 6]
where each of the N−1 cops is controlled by a different player (whereas in CR a single player controls all
cops). G denotes the graph of the game, s0 the starting state or position and γ, ε are game parameters.
In that paper we prove (among other results) that ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) has a Nash equilibrium (NE) in trigger
strategies [7] which is generally nonpositional (i.e., some player’s next move depends on the past).
In the current paper we explore conditions on the form of G, s0 and the values of N, γ, ε under
which a trigger strategies NE of ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) is actually positional (i.e., each player’s next move
depends only on the current state). To obtain an exhaustive list of such conditions it is necessary to
use a graph classification based on a novel concept, the state cop number, which is a refinement of the
classic cop number [1].
2 Preliminaries
All graphs considered here are undirected, finite, connected and simple. N (u) denotes the open
neighborhood of vertex u, d(u, v) the distance between u and v and |A| the cardinality of set A.
In classic CR, c (G) denotes the cop number of graph G, defined as the minimum number of cops
needed to ensure capture from any possible starting position.
In this paper we focus on auxiliary games ΓnN (G|s0, γ, ε) which we use in [3] to prove the existence
of a NE in ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε). The full story can be found in [3]; here we present basic notation and facts.
For each n ∈ {1, ..., N}, ΓnN (G|s0, γ, ε) is a zero-sum two-player stochastic game [2] played on the
graph G = (V,E); γ ∈ (0, 1) and ε ∈
[
0, 1N−1
]
are game parameters. Player Pn controls the n-th token,
i.e., cop Cn for n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, or the robber R for n = N ; player P−n controls the rest tokens.
A state s of the game has the form s =
(
x1, ..., xN , n
)
where xi ∈ V is the location of the i-th token
and n ∈ {1, ..., N} is the token moving next. S denotes the set of all states and can be partitioned as:
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1. S = Sc ∪ Snc ∪ {τ} where, Sc is the set of capture states, in which at least one Cn is on the same
vertex as R (i.e., xn = xN ), Snc the set of noncapture states where no Cn is on the same vertex
as R and τ the terminal state that finally occurs in case of capture; or
2. S = ∪Nn=1S
n ∪ {τ} where Sn :=
{
s : s =
(
x1, ..., xN , n
)}
is the set of states in which the n-th
token has the move.
The game begins at some initial state s0, which also specifies the first token to move. In each turn
a single token is moved from its current vertex to a neighboring one, always following the sequence
..., C1, C2, ..., CN−1, R,C1, ... . The game lasts an infinite number of turns but is effectively over as soon
as capture occurs, if it does, since right after the system moves to state τ and stays there ad infinitum.
Regarding the players’ payoffs and since ΓnN (G|s0, γ, ε) is a zero-sum game, it suffices to specify
Pn’s payoff. If the capture time (i.e., the first time that a capture state s ∈ Sc occurs) is t, then:
1. in the game ΓNN (G|s0, γ, ε), PN ’s payoff is −γ
t;
2. in the game ΓnN (G|s0, γ, ε) (n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}), Pn’s payoff is
(1− ε)
K
γt : when K cops (K ∈ {1, ..., N − 2} ) including Cn are in the same vertex as R;
ε
N −K − 1
γt : when K cops (K ∈ {1, ..., N − 2} ) but no Cn are in the same vertex as R;
γt
N − 1
: when all N − 1 cops are in the same vertex as R.
In case capture never takes place, Pn’s payoff is zero. P−n’s payoff is always the negative of Pn’s.
ΓNN (G|s0, γ, ε) is essentially the modified CR game introduced in [3], the basic difference with classic
CR being that time is counted in turns instead of rounds; a single token, cop or robber, moves in each
turn. Hence P−N aims to effect capture as soon as possible and PN aims to delay it as much as possible.
In this case the players’ optimal strategies depend on G and s0, but not on γ, ε.
In games ΓnN (G|s0, γ, ε) however, where Cn plays against the robber and N − 2 “robber-friendly”
cops, the players’ optimal strategies depend also on the values of γ, ε. If ε > 0, then P−n’s best outcome
is evasion of the robber and from then on, depending on γ, ε and the respective capture times he may
prefer a capture by one of his tokens, or a joint capture involving also Cn, or a late as possible pure Cn
capture. The difference in case ε = 0 is that P−n is indifferent between letting the robber evade and
capturing him by one of his tokens, since in both cases he gets his best outcome, i.e., a zero payoff.
We will shortly return to these optimal strategies. But first let us introduce a few additional notions.
A history h = (s0, s1, ...) is a finite or infinite sequence of states. Let Hf denote the set of finite
length histories (s0, ..., s), H
n
f those where token nmoves, i.e., s ∈ S
n andHnfnc those where s ∈ S
n∩Snc.
A pure (or deterministic) strategy for the m-th token is a function σm which maps finite histories
to next moves. That is, ∀h = (s0, s1, ..., st) ∈ Hf : σ
m (h) = v specifies that: if the game started at s0
and passed through s1, ..., st, then next the m-th token should move to vertex v.
A strategy is positional (or stationary Markovian) if it depends only on the current state st, i.e.,
∀h = (s0, ..., st) ∈ Hf , σ
m (h) = σm (st) .
A strategy profile (or, simply a profile) is a tuple σ =
(
σ1, ..., σN
)
. A profile is positional if it
consists solely of positional strategies. Otherwise it is called nonpositional.
Standard results [2] yield that the players in games ΓnN (G|s0, γ, ε) have optimal, pure positional
strategies for all n, s0 and γ, ε. This is the only kind of strategies we consider then for these games.
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Furthermore, since Pn controls only the n-th token, his strategy consists of a single function σ
n; a
P−n strategy though is a “vector” function σ
−n = (σm)m∈{1,...,N}\n with one strategy for each of P−n’s
tokens; and both players’ strategies together yield profile σ =
(
σ1, ..., σN
)
= (σn, σ−n).
Since the form of the games is deterministic, if moreover the players use pure strategies, the games
evolve deterministically. That is, given an initial state s and a pure strategy profile σ, the tuple (s, σ)
leads in a deterministic manner to either capture or evasion of the robber.
Keeping the above in mind, in the sequel, we will need the following definitions.
T (s, σ) denotes the capture time (finite or not) starting from state s under pure profile σ.
σ̂n denotes a pure positional optimal strategy for the n-th token in modified CR game ΓNN (G|s0, γ, ε),
and Σ̂n the set of all σ̂n’s. Strategies σ̂n will be called CR-optimal.
Note that: for any initial state s and CR-optimal profile σ̂ = (σ̂1, ..., σ̂N ) such that (s, σ̂) leads to
capture, it is always the same cop effecting capture and at the same time T (s, σ̂). This follows from
the facts: (i) in each turn only one token moves and (ii) under CR-optimal play, R does never run
into a cop1. Let Ĉ(s) then denote the cop effecting capture under every CR-optimal profile σ̂, when
the game starts at s, and T̂ (s) := T (s, σ̂) the respective number of moves. If Ĉ(s) = Cm for some
m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, then at times we denote this by Ĉm(s).
Finally, for all n,m ∈ {1, ..., N}, let φnm be an optimal, pure positional strategy for the n-th token
in game ΓmN (G|s0, γ, ε) (where dependence on γ, ε has been supressed); let Φ
n
m be the respective set.
We now turn to SCAR games ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) and the so-called trigger strategies profiles σ, where
σ :=
(
σ1, ..., σN
)
and each trigger strategy σn is composed from strategies φnm as follows:
For all h = (s0, ..., s) ∈ Hf
σn(h) :=
{
φnn(s) as long as every player m ∈ {1, ..., N} \n follows φ
m
m;
φnm(s) as soon as some player m ∈ {1, ..., N} \n deviates from φ
m
m.
In general, σn is nonpositional by construction (and so is σ then) since it takes into account the players’
past behavior. However, if φnn (s) = φ
n
m (s) for all m and “relevant” states s, σ
n becomes positional.
To better understand the meaning of this latter condition, consider the following. Roughly speaking,
cop Cn’s optimal strategy φ
n
n in the game Γ
n
N (where he plays against a “coalition” of the remaining
players) must be also optimal (i) in every game ΓmN with m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} \n (where he and the
remaining players ally against cop Cm) and (ii) in the CR game Γ
N
N (where he and the remaining cops
chase the robber). In other words: σ is positional iff, for every m and n, the n-th token’s CR-optimal
strategy σ̂n is also optimal in ΓmN . This can be stated formally as follows.
Condition 2.1 Let σ = (σ1, ..., σN ) be a trigger strategies profile in ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) with σ
n consisting
of (φnm)
N
m=1. Then σ is positional (resp. nonpositional) iff A1 (resp. A2) holds:
A1 : ∀n,m ∈ {1, ..., N} , ∃σ̂n ∈ Σ̂n : ∀h = (s0, ..., s) ∈ H
n
fnc, φ
n
m(s) = σ̂
n(s), (1)
A2 : ∃n,m ∈ {1, ..., N} : ∀σ̂n ∈ Σ̂n, ∃h = (s0, ..., s) ∈ H
n
fnc : φ
n
m(s) 6= σ̂
n(s). (2)
The goal of this paper is to explore the form of graphs G and initial states s0 and the values of
parameters N , γ and ε, under which, each of the mutually exclusive conditions A1 or A2 holds. Given
ΓNN is the modified CR, Φ
n
N = Σ̂
n and A1 holds always for m = N . Hence we will be examining the
remaining cases.
1Contrary to the classic CR, where capture under optimal play occurs in the minimum number of rounds and it can
possibly be effected by different cops, in modified CR capture under optimal play (i.e., for every σ̂ ∈ Σ̂ = ×n∈{1,...,N}Σ̂
n)
occurs in the minimum number of moves and thus always by the same cop.
3
3 Analysis
The study is divided as follows. In Section 3.1 we study the case |V | = 2, ε ≥ 0 and in Section 3.2 the
case |V | > 2, ε > 0; Section 3.3 concerns the case |V | > 2, ε = 0 and is further divided in Section 3.3.1,
where c(G) ≤ N − 1, and in Section 3.3.2, where c(G) > N − 1.
To avoid trivialities we only consider initial states s0 ∈ Snc.
3.1 Case |V | = 2 (the path P2) ε ≥ 0
Proposition 3.1 Let G = (V,E) with |V | = 2. Then Γ3(G|s0, γ, ε) has a (unique) positional trigger
strategies profile σ iff ε ∈
[
0, 12
)
and γ ∈
[√
ε
1−ε ,
1
2−2ε
]
.
Proof. The set of noncapture states is
Snc = {(1, 1, 2, 1), (1, 1, 2, 2), (1, 1, 2, 3), (2, 2, 1, 1), (2, 2, 1, 2), (2, 2, 1, 3)} .
Due to symmetry we only consider initial states s0 = (1, 1, 2, n), n ∈ {1, 2, 3}; then each (1, 1, 2, n) has
two possible successors (e.g., the successors of (1, 1, 2, 1) are (1, 1, 2, 1) and (1, 1, 2, 2)) i.e., given s0,
each token has two positional strategies. Thus, in this case Condition A1 becomes:
∀n,m ∈ {1, 2, 3} ,∃σ̂n ∈ Σ̂n : φnm(1, 1, 2, n) = σ̂
n(1, 1, 2, n). (3)
We examine under which conditions (3) holds and hence σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) is positional.
To begin with, the (unique) CR-optimal strategies are: for the cops, σ̂1(1, 1, 2, 1) = σ̂2(1, 1, 2, 2) = 2
(immediate capture), and for the robber σ̂3(1, 1, 2, 3) = 2 (stay in place).
I. In game Γ13(G|s0, γ, ε) (P1 controls C1, P−1 controls C2 and R) we have the following.
For token C1, the unique optimal strategy φ
1
1 ∈ Φ
1
1 prescribes immediate capture at s = (1, 1, 2, 1),
i.e., φ11(s) = 2. Indeed, if C1 captures say at time t, then P1’s payoff is (1− ε)γ
t. Otherwise, depending
on the values of γ, ε, P−1 will optimally play so that, either C2 effects capture in the next move, and
then P1’s payoff will be εγ
t+1, or C2 stays put and R runs into both C1, C2 in the next move, and P1’s
payoff will be 12γ
t+2. But (1− ε) γt > max
(
εγt+1, 12γ
t+2
)
for all (γ, ε) ∈ (0, 1)× [0, 12 ]. Hence,
∀ (γ, ε) ∈ (0, 1) × [0,
1
2
], φ11(1, 1, 2, 1) = 2 = σ̂
1(1, 1, 2, 1). (4)
For token C2, moving at time t from state s = (1, 1, 2, 2) we have the following possibilities.
1. C2 captures at t; P−1’s loss is εγ
t;
2. C2 stays put at t, R runs into both C1, C2 at t+ 1; P−1’s loss is
1
2γ
t+1;
3. C2 and R stay put and C1 captures at t+ 2; P−1’s loss is (1− ε)γ
t+2.
For a positional σ2, P−1 must not prefer (2) or (3) to (1), i.e.,
εγt ≤ min
(
1
2
γt+1 , (1 − ε)γt+2
)
⇒ γ ≥ max
(
2ε,
√
ε
1− ε
)
(5)
Given γ < 1, from γ ≥ 2ε we get ε < 12 . Therefore,
ε ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
and γ ∈
[√
ε
1− ε
, 1
)
(6)
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guarantee the existence of a φ21 such that:
φ21(s) = σ̂
2(s).
For token R, moving at time t from state s = (1, 1, 2, 3) we have the following possibilities.
1. R stays put at t and C1 effects capture at t+ 1; P−1’s loss is (1− ε)γ
+1.
2. R runs into both C1, C2 at t; P−1’s loss is
1
2γ
t.
For a positional σ3, P−1 must not prefer (2) to (1):
(1− ε)γt+1 ≤
1
2
γt ⇒ γ ≤
1
2− 2ε
. (7)
II. In game Γ23(G|s0, γ, ε) (P2 controls C2, P−2 controls C1 and R) we have the following.
Regarding token C2: moving at t from s = (1, 1, 2, 2), the unique optimal strategy prescribes
immediate capture, i.e., φ22(s) = 2 = σ̂
2(s), for all (γ, ε) ∈ (0, 1)× [0, 12 ]. Indeed, P2’s payoff in this case
is (1 − ε)γt. Otherwise, optimally R stays in place at t+ 1 and at t+ 2 C1 captures with P2’s payoff
being εγt+2 < (1− ε)γt.
Regarding token C1:
1. if C1 captures at t, then P−2’s loss is εγ
t;
2. otherwise (optimally) C2 captures at t+ 1 and P−2’s loss is (1− ε)γ
t+1.
For a positional σ1 it must be:
εγt ≤ (1− ε)γt+1 ⇒ γ ≥
ε
1− ε
. (8)
Regarding the robber token R we have the following possibilities.
1. R stays put at time t and C1 effects capture at t+ 1; P−2’s loss is εγ
t+1;
2. R and C1 stay put and C2 captures at time t+ 2; P−2’s loss is (1− ε)γ
t+2.
3. R runs into both C1, C2 at t; P−2’s loss is
1
2γ
t.
For a positional σ3 (1) must be at least as good for P−2 as (2) and (3). By (8) we have,
γ ≥
ε
1− ε
⇒ εγt+1 ≤ (1− ε)γt+2
and P−2 does not prefer (2) to (1). For (1) to be at least as good as (3) it must be εγ
t+1 ≤ 12γ
t. If
ε = 0, this holds always. If ε > 0 it must be
γ ≤
1
2ε
. (9)
For a positional profile σ =
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
)
, (6)-(9) must all hold; this yields the required result.
Proposition 3.2 Let G = (V,E) with |V | = 2; let N > 3 and ε > 0. Then every trigger strategies
profile σ of ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) is nonpositional, for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof. Consider game Γ1N (G|s0, γ, ε) (P1 controls C1, P−1 controls C2, C3, ..., CN−1 and R). Let
s = (1, ..., 1, 2, 2) and consider C2’s optimal move at time t from s. If C2 captures R, then P−1’s loss is
εγt; if C2 stays put and C3 captures at t+1, P−1’s loss is εγ
t+1 < εγt (since ε > 0). So for the unique
φ21, σ̂
2 it is φ21 (s) = 1 6= 2 = σ̂
2 (s). We conclude that σ2 and hence σ is always nonpositional.
Proposition 3.3 Let G = (V,E) with |V | = 2; let N > 3 and ε = 0. The following hold.
1. ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) has at least one nonpositional trigger strategies profile σ, for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
2. ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) has at least one positional trigger strategies profile σ iff γ ∈
(
0, 1N−1
]
.
Proof. All s ∈ Snc are of the form s = (v1, ..., v1, v2, n) with v1 6= v2 (no cop is in the same vertex as the
robber). At any such state s the unique CR-optimal strategies are: for cop Cn, σ̂
n(v1, ..., v1, v2, n) = v2
(immediate capture), for the robber R, σ̂N (v1, ..., v1, v2, N) = v2 (stay in place).
1. Consider game Γ1N (G|s0, γ, ε) and token C2 having the next move at state s = (v1, ..., v1, v2, 2).
Moving to v2 effects a capture which gives P−1 his minimum loss of 0; but so does staying in place,
provided some other Ck (k ∈ {3, ..., N − 1}) effects the capture. Thus there exists φ
2
1 : φ
2
1 (s) = v1 6=
v2 = σ̂
2 (s). Hence there exists σ2 and thus σ which is nonpositional.
2. Consider game ΓmN (G|s0, γ, ε) (m ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1})
For Cm: immediate capture (i.e., moving to v2) results to a payoff of (1− ε)γ
t = γt > 0 for Pm. If
Cm does not capture immediately, then optimally P−m effects a Cn (n 6= m) capture any time before
Cm resulting to a payoff of 0 < γ
t for Pm. So Pm prefers immediate capture and thus for the only φ
m
m
it is φmm (v1, ..., v1, v2,m) = v2 = σ̂
m (v1, ..., v1, v2,m).
For Cn (n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} \m): moving to v2 effects a capture which gives P−m his minimum loss
of 0. Thus there exists φnm : φ
n
m (v1, ..., v1, v2, n) = v2 = σ̂
n (v1, ..., v1, v2, n).
For R: If m ∈ {2, ..., N − 1}, then R optimally stays put and capture is effected by any Cn with
n < m, resulting to a loss of 0 for P−m. For m = 1 we have the following. If R stays put at time t, C1
captures at t+ 1 and P−m’s loss is (1 − ε)γ
t+1 = γt+1. If R runs into (all) cops, P−m’s loss is
1
N−1γ
t.
Thus if γt+1 ≤ γ
t
N−1 ⇔ γ ≤
1
N−1 , there exists φ
N
m : φ
N
m (v1, ..., v1, v2, N) = v2 = σ̂
N (v1, ..., v1, v2, N).
Hence, A1 holds and a positional profile σ exists iff γ ∈
(
0, 1N−1
]
.
3.2 Case |V | ≥ 3 and ε > 0
From this point on, unless otherwise specified, we consider N ≥ 3.
Proposition 3.4 Let G = (V,E) with |V | ≥ 3; let ε > 0. Then every trigger strategies profile σ of
ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) is nonpositional, for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Given |V | ≥ 3, from any s0 it is possible to reach at some t a state s = (v1, v2, ..., vN , 2) ∈ Snc
(so C2 moves next) with v1 6= v2 and vN ∈ N (v2). Now, at s, every CR-optimal σ̂
2 dictates immediate
capture by C2, i.e., ∀σ̂
2 ∈ Σ̂2, σ̂2(s) = vN . In game Γ
1
N (G|s0, γ, ε) though at state s, if C2 captures
immediately R, P−1’s loss is εγ
t. If P−1 keeps C2, ..., CN−1 in place and lets R move to v2 at t+N − 2,
then, if k ∈ {1, ..., N − 2} is the number of P−1’s cop tokens located at v2 including C2, P−1’s loss is
ε
N−k−1γ
t+N−2 < εγt. Hence, at s, P−1 prefers to defer capture and never capture with C2. Thus,
∀φ21 ∈ Φ
,2
1 ,∀σ̂
2 ∈ Σ̂2, ∃h = (s0, ..., s) ∈ H
n
fnc : φ
2
1(s) 6= vN = σ̂
2(s).
Consequently every σ2 and corresponding profile σ is nonpositional.
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3.3 Case |V | ≥ 3 and ε = 0
Proposition 3.5 Let G = (V,E) with |V | ≥ 3 and ε = 0. Then in every game ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) there
exists always a nonpositional trigger strategies profile σ, for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Given |V | ≥ 3, from any starting s0 it is possible to reach at some t state s = (v1, v2, ..., vN , N) ∈
Snc (so R has the next move) such that v1 6= v2 and vN ∈ N (v2). Now, under no CR-optimal σ̂
N
R ever moves to v2. In game Γ
1
N (G|s0, γ, ε) though P−1 can, under optimal play move R to v2 since
then he has a minimum loss of εN−k−1γ
t = 0, where k is the number of P−1’s cop tokens located at v2,
including C2. Thus,
∃φN1 : ∀σ̂
N ∈ Σ̂N ,∀s0 ∈ Snc,∃h = (s0, ..., s) ∈ H
N
fnc : φ
N
1 (s) 6= σ̂
N (s);
i.e., there always exists a nonpositional σN and a corresponding nonpositional σ.
3.3.1 Case: c (G) ≤ N − 1
In this part of the paper we connect positionality of σ to the cop number c (G) of graph G. First we
examine the case where G is a path (hence c (G) = 1) with |V | ≥ 3. 2
Proposition 3.6 Let G be a path with |V | ≥ 3; let ε = 0. Then ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) has a positional trigger
strategies profile σ iff (i) s0 is such that all cops are to one side of the robber, and (ii) γ ∈
(
0, 1N−1
]
.
Proof. Let S′nc denote the set of states where the robber is between some cops and S
′′
nc = Snc\S
′
nc
the set of states where all cops are to one side of the robber. In Part I we show that in every game
ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) with s0 ∈ S
′
nc every σ is nonpositional. In part II then we show that, if s0 ∈ S
′′
nc, then a
positional σ exists iff γ ∈
(
0, 1N−1
]
. The combination of Parts I and II yields the result sought.
I. Initial states s0 ∈ S
′
nc. From any such s0 we can always reach, at say time t, a state s˜ in which R
has the move, some cops are immediately to his left and the rest are immediately to his right. Now,
every CR-optimal robber strategy σ̂N at state s˜ dictates that the robber stays in place. In game
Γ1N (G|s0, γ, ε) on the contrary, every optimal strategy φ
N
1 at s˜ dictates that the robber moves into the
vertex not occupied by C1, because this yields a minimum loss of εγ
t = 0 for P−n, whereas otherwise
C1 optimally captures right after and P−n’s loss is (1− ε)γ
t+1 = γt+1 > 0. Thus,
∀φN1 ∈ Φ
N
1 , ∀σ̂
N ∈ Σ̂N , ∀s0 ∈ S
′
nc, ∃h = (s0, ..., s˜) ∈ H
N
fnc : φ
N
1 (s) 6= σ̂
N (s).
Hence in this case, every strategy σN and corresponding profile σ is nonpositional.
II. Initial states s0 ∈ S
′′
nc. Let (without loss of generality) S
′′
ncl ⊂ S
′′
nc be the states where all cops are
to the left of R; for every s0 ∈ S
′′
ncl let S
′′
ncl (s0) be the set of states that can occur starting from s0, i.e.,
S′′ncl (s0) := {s : ∃h = (s0, ..., s) ∈ Hfnc} .
Observe that, for all s0 ∈ S
′′
ncl, S
′′
ncl (s0) = S
′′
ncl. Then existence of a positional σ implies:
∀m,n ∈ {1, ..., N}, ∃φnm, σ̂
n : ∀s ∈ S′′ncl ∩ S
n, φnm(s) = σ̂
n(s). (10)
Given G is a path, for any s ∈ S′′ncl and under every CR-optimal profile σ̂, the cop Ĉ (s) that
captures is the one that is “closer” to R, taking also into account whose turn is to move and at time
2In a sense this proposition can be seen as an extension of Proposition 3.3, part 2, to paths with |V | > 2.
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T̂ (s). Let σ̂∗ = (σ̂
1
∗ , ..., σ̂
N
∗ ) be the CR-optimal profile where, Cn (n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1}) always moves
towards R, and R moves away from the cops, reaches the end of the path and waits there until capture.
Instead of (10) we show the following which is equivalent:
∀m,n ∈ {1, ..., N}, ∃φnm : ∀s ∈ S
′′
ncl ∩ S
n, φnm(s) = σ̂
n
∗ (s). (11)
Now fix an m ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1} for the rest of the proof and consider game ΓmN (G|s0, γ, ε). We
partition S′′ncl into two mutually disjoint sets SA, SB defined below and examine each case separately.
SA :=
{
s ∈ S′′ncl : under (every) σ̂, cop Cn (n 6= m) captures (i.e., Ĉ (s) = Cn) at T̂ (s)
}
,
SB :=
{
s ∈ S′′ncl : under (every) σ̂, cop Cm captures (i.e., Ĉ (s) = Cm) at T̂ (s)
}
.
Case II.A: s ∈ SA. For any s ∈ SA, if P−m uses the chosen CR-optimal (cop and robber) strategies
σ̂n∗ (n ∈ {1, ..., N}\m) he can force a Cn capture at time T̂ (s) for any strategy of Pm and get his
minimum loss of εγT̂ (s) = 0. Given this strategy of P−m, Pm cannot affect the outcome. Thus any
strategy is optimal for him and so is the CR-optimal strategy σ̂m∗ . Hence
∀n ∈ {1, ..., N} ∃φnm : ∀s ∈ SA ∩ S
n, φnm(s) = σ̂
n
∗ (s). (12)
Case II.B: s ∈ SB. Assume Pm uses σ̂
m
∗ for Cm and consider the options of P−m. It can be seen that,
depending on the state s, there exist only two possibilities, which partition further SB as follows:
1. States s ∈ SB1 : Pm can force a pure Cm capture, for any strategy of P−m, and
2. States s ∈ SB2 : P−m can effect a joint capture, i.e., one involving Cm and some P−m cop tokens.
If s ∈ SB1 , then under optimal play (in Γ
m
N (G|s0, γ, ε)) Cm chases R till the end of the path and
captures him at time T̂ (s); this describes the optimal strategies for Cm and R. The remaining tokens
Cn cannot affect the outcome. Thus, any strategy is optimal for them and so is the chosen σ̂
n
∗ . Hence
∀n ∈ {1, ..., N} ∃φnm : ∀s ∈ SB1 ∩ S
n, φnm(s) = σ̂
n
∗ (s). (13)
Let now s ∈ SB2 . First note that the only optimal strategies for Pm in this case are strategies
σ̂m ∈ Σ̂m. Indeed, and for any strategy σ−m of P−m, if Pm uses any σ̂
m for Cm the outcome is either
a pure Cm capture, at the fastest possible time, or a joint capture, at the fastest possible time. Any
other strategy of Pm leads to suboptimal for him outcomes, even to pure Cn (n 6= m) capture.
Assuming Pm uses σ̂
m
∗ for Cm, then P−m can effect a joint capture at some time t. First note that
a joint capture can only happen after a move by R and only if he deviates from σ̂N , and second that
this can only be at a time t < T̂ (s).3 Moreover it is clear that P−m always prefers the joint capture
which: (i) happens at the latest possible time, call it T˜ (s) and (ii) involves the largest possible number
of his cops, call it K˜ (s). Now note that both these maximum values are achieved by following σ̂−m∗
until T˜ (s) − 1, at which time the robber is at the path end and K˜ (s) + 1 cops are next to him and
letting R fall on the cops at T˜ (s); call this strategy σ˜−m. In this case P−m’s loss is
1− ε
K˜ (s) + 1
γT˜ (s) =
1
K˜ (s) + 1
γT˜ (s).
3The latter is a consequence of the following: In a pure Cm capture under every σ̂, only the moves of Cm and R are
relevant (i.e., the remaining cops cannot affect the outcome). Thus if P−m could effect a joint capture at t > T̂ (s), given
Cm follows σ̂
m, he would be able to do so only due to moves of R. But if R alone could achieve capture later than T̂ (s),
when Cm uses σ̂
m, then T̂ (s) would not be the optimal CR time, which is a contradiction.
8
Alternatively, P−m can choose to stick to σ̂
−m
∗ until the end and let Cm capture at T̂ (s). Since at T̂ (s)
(resp. at T˜ (s)) Cm (resp. R) has the move, we have T̂ (s) = T˜ (s) +m. In this case P−m’s loss is
(1− ε)γT̂ (s) = γT̂ (s).
Then σ̂−m∗ is optimal for P−m iff
γT̂ (s) ≤
1
K˜ (s) + 1
γT˜ (s) ⇔ γm ≤
1
K˜ (s) + 1
⇔ γ ≤
(
1
K˜ (s) + 1
)1/m
. (14)
For a positional σ to exist (14) must hold for all s ∈ SB2 and thus also for the minimum of
(
1
K˜(s)+1
)1/m
.
This quantity is increasing in m and decreasing in K˜ (s) and thus takes its minimum for m = 1 and
K˜ (s) = N − 2, i.e., when Cm = C1 and at T˜ (s) all cops are next to the robber. Then (14) becomes
γ ≤
1
N − 1
. (15)
Hence, under and only under (15) we have
∀n ∈ {1, ..., N} ∃φnm : ∀s ∈ SB2 ∩ S
n, φnm(s) = σ̂
n
∗ (s). (16)
Given SB = SB1 ∪ SB2 , S
′′
ncl = SA ∪ SB and combining (12), (13) and (16) yields that a positional
trigger strategies profile σ exists iff (15) holds.
Remark 3.7 We now move on to graphs other than paths. It is not hard to see that, for any such
graph and pair of noncapture states s0, s, there exists a history h which starts at s0 and ends at s. I.e.,
∀s0, s ∈ Snc, ∃h = (s0, ..., s) ∈ Hfnc
This means that, for every s0, the set of endstates of all finite noncapture histories starting at s0 is
exactly Snc. Thus Conditions A1, A2 for positional and nonpositional respectively profiles reduce to:
Condition 3.8 Let σ = (σ1, ..., σN ) be a trigger strategies profile in ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε), with σ
n consisting
of (φnm)
N
m=1. Then σ is positional (resp. nonpositional) iff B1 (resp. B2) holds:
B1 : ∀n,m ∈ {1, ..., N}, ∃σ̂n ∈ Σ̂n : ∀s ∈ Sn ∩ Snc, φ
n
m(s) = σ̂
n(s), (17)
B2 : ∃n,m ∈ {1, ..., N} : ∀σ̂n ∈ Σ̂n, ∃s ∈ Sn ∩ Snc : φ
n
m(s) 6= σ̂
n(s). (18)
The next proposition settles the issue for all rest graphs G with c (G) ≤ N − 1.
Proposition 3.9 Consider ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) where G = (V,E) is not a path, c (G) ≤ N − 1 and ε = 0.
Then every trigger strategies profile σ is nonpositional for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Given G is not a path, it is |V | ≥ 3 and, G contains, or is equal to either the clique K3 with
E = {{v1, v2} , {v2, v3} , {v3, v1}}, or the star S3 E = {{v1, v2} , {v1, v3} , {v1, v4}}. By Remark 3.7 then
we have that, for any initial state s0, the state s˜ where, some of the cops are on vertex v2, the rest are
on v3, the robber is on v1 and it is the robber’s turn to move can always occur. Moreover, c(G) ≤ N−1
means that, starting from s˜, capture occurs under CR-optimal play by Ĉ(s˜); let Ĉ(s˜) = Cm.
Given Proposition 3.5, to show the current claim suffices to show there exist no positional profiles
σ. Assume (towards contradiction) there exists positional profile σ. Now consider game ΓmN (G|s0, γ, ε)
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and the case where state s˜ has been reached. Then it must be that, there exist optimal φnm such that,
Condition B1 is satisfied for that particular m and s = s˜. However, if a CR-optimal strategy σ̂n is used
for every n ∈ {1, ..., N}, then starting from s˜, profile σ̂ leads to capture by Cm at T̂ (s˜), in which case
P−m’s loss will be γ
T̂ (s˜) > 0. But we know that, starting from s˜, P−m can achieve his minimum loss of
0 by moving R into whichever of v2 or v3 does not contain Cm. Hence using σ̂
n for every n ∈ {1, ..., N}
is suboptimal for P−m when starting from s˜. Thus, there exists no positional σ.
3.3.2 Case: c (G) > N − 1
In this section we use the state cop number cN (G|s) defined in Appendix A. Thus we urge the reader
to study this part before proceeding.
For any given N , we define G(N) by
G(N) := {G : c(G) > N − 1}, (19)
i.e., the set of graphs examined in this section4 or, equivalently by (40), the set
G(N) := {G : ∃s with c(G|s) =∞}. (20)
Elements of G(3) include Dodecahedron and the Petersen graph (both of which have c(G) = 3) as well
as any other graph resulting by bridging either of these to another graph.5 The following propositions
involve sets of graphs that form a partition of G(N). Moreover, we sometimes simply write G rather
than G(N) and likewise for its constituents.
Given N , consider the following subsets of G:
1. G1 consists of those graphs in G where there exists a state starting from which, cooperation of
two, or more cops, up to N − 1 is necessary and sufficient to ensure capture in Γ˘N (G). I.e.,
G1 := {G ∈ G : ∃s with c(G|s) = k ∈ {2, ..., N − 1}}. (21)
2. G′1 is the complement of G1 (with respect to G). Here, at every noncapture state, either the robber
evades under CR-optimal play, or there exists a single cop who can ensure capture. I.e.,
G′1 := G\G1 = {G ∈ G : ∀s ∈ Snc, c(G|s) ∈ {1,∞}}. (22)
3. Finally, G2 consists of graphs such that, when it is the robber’s turn to move, he can always
evade. I.e.,
G2 := {G ∈ G : ∀s ∈ S
N ∩ Snc it is c(G|s) =∞}. (23)
As we will shortly see, G2 is a subset of G
′
1.
Graphs in G1(3) are typically graphs of G(3) containing as subgraphs cycles of length l ≥ 4. Some
graphs in G′1(3) are those resulting by bridging Dodecahedron or Petersen with paths or trees. Some
graphs in G2(3) are Dodecahedron and Petersen themselves.
The next proposition concerns G1. Note that holds, not only for ε = 0 but for every ε ∈
[
0, 12
]
.6
4It is a well known result [1] that, for every k ∈ N, there exists a graph G with c(G) > k.
5Recall that a “bridge” is an edge whose deletion results to a disconnected graph. Then our claim follows from the
(easy to see) fact that, if a graph G with c(G) = k is bridged to another graph, the resulting graph H will have c(H) ≥ k.
6However, for ε > 0 the claim has been already shown in Proposition 3.4.
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Proposition 3.10 Consider ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) with G ∈ G1 and ε ∈
[
0, 12
]
. Then every profile σ is
nonpositional for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Let s ∈ Snc with c(G|s) = k ∈ {2, ..., N − 1}; let Ĉ(s) = Cm. Consider game Γ
m
N (G|s, γ, ε).
Given c(G|s) ≥ 2, P−m can enforce robber evasion in Γ
m
N (G|s, γ, ε). Hence it cannot be φ
n
m(st) = σ̂
n(st)
for all n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}\m and all states st ∈ S
n following s, because this allows Pm to capture R
and is suboptimal play for P−m. Hence, there exists at least one n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}\m and at least one
st ∈ S
n following s such that, φnm(st) 6= σ̂
n(st), ∀σ̂
n ∈ Σ̂n, leading to the result sought.
In the following lemma we show that G1 ∩ G2 = ∅ and hence G2 ⊂ G
′
1.
Lemma 3.11 G1(N) ∩ G2(N) = ∅.
Proof. Given N , assume on the contrary G1 ∩ G2 6= ∅ and let G ∈ G1 ∩ G2. G ∈ G1 means there exists
state s such that c(G|s) = k ∈ {2, ..., N − 1}. This in its turn means that, at s, there exists no cop who
(a) is located next to R and (b) plays before R (because otherwise it would have been c(G|s) = 1). This
again means that, starting from s and irrespective of the moves of the cops playing before R, R will
have the chance to move i.e., the game will reach a state s′ ∈ SN ∩Snc. Now by assumption G belongs
also to G2 and thus c(G|s
′) = ∞ (i.e., starting from s′ R evades under CR-optimal robber play). But
then (from the previous argument) we have that, under CR-optimal robber play R evades also from s
and thus c(G|s) = ∞, which however contradicts the assumption c(G|s) = k ∈ {2, ..., N − 1}. Hence
there exists no such graph G and thus G1 ∩ G2 = ∅.
Furthermore G′1 clearly contains graphs that do not belong in G2 and thus we have the following.
Corollary 3.12 G2(N) ⊂ G
′
1(N).
Remark 3.13 An important fact is the following: c(G|s) = ∞ for all s ∈ SN ∩ Snc implies that,
under CR-optimal robber play, the only states that can lead to capture in any G ∈ G2 are those where
a cop is next to R and moves before him.7
Next we identify one more set of graphs and respective games where positional profiles σ exist.
Proposition 3.14 Consider ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) with G ∈ G2 and ε = 0. Then there exists a positional
profile σ for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Fix an m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} for the rest of the proof and consider ΓmN (G|s0, γ, ε). We partition
Snc into three mutually disjoint sets SA, SB and SC defined below and examine each case separately.
SA := {s ∈ Snc : under (every) σ̂ the robber evades} ,
SB :=
{
s ∈ Snc : under (every) σ̂, cop Cn (n 6= m) captures (i.e., Ĉ (s) = Cn) at T̂ (s)
}
,
SC :=
{
s ∈ Snc : under (every) σ̂, cop Cm captures (i.e., Ĉ (s) = Cm) at T̂ (s)
}
.
Case A: s ∈ SA. For any s ∈ SA, if P−m uses any CR-optimal cop and robber strategies σ̂
n (n ∈
{1, ..., N}\m) he can force evasion of R for any strategy of Pm and get his minimum loss of 0. Given
P−m’s strategy, Pm cannot affect the outcome. Thus any strategy is optimal for him and so is any
CR-optimal strategy σ̂m. Hence
∀n ∈ {1, ..., N} ∃φnm, σ̂
n : ∀s ∈ SA ∩ S
n, φnm(s) = σ̂
n(s). (24)
7Note that this type of states are a trivial case of states s with c(G|s) = 1 existing in every graph.
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Case B: s ∈ SB . By Remark 3.13, these are states such that: (i) a cop Cn (n 6= m) is next the robber
and moves before him and (ii) if there exists another cop Ck who is also next the robber, then Ck
moves after Cn. Now, for any s ∈ SB , if P−m uses any CR-optimal strategies σ̂
n (n ∈ {1, ..., N}\m)
Cn captures at time T̂ (s) for any strategy of Pm and P−m gets his minimum loss of εγ
T̂ (s) = 0. Given
P−m’s strategy, Pm cannot affect the outcome. Thus any strategy is optimal for him and so is any
CR-optimal strategy σ̂m. Hence
∀n ∈ {1, ..., N} ∃φnm, σ̂
n : ∀s ∈ SB ∩ S
n, φnm(s) = σ̂
n(s). (25)
Case C: s ∈ SC . By Remark 3.13, these are states such that: (i) cop Cm is next to the robber and
moves before him and (ii) if there exists another cop Cn who is also next the robber, then Cn moves
after Cm. Now, for any s ∈ SC , if Pm uses any CR-optimal cop strategy σ̂
m, then Cm captures at
time T̂ (s) for any strategy of P−m and Pm gets his maximum gain of (1 − ε)γ
T̂ (s) = γT̂ (s). Given
Pm’s strategy, P−m cannot affect the outcome. Thus any strategy is optimal for him and so is any
CR-optimal strategies σ̂n (n ∈ {1, ..., N}\m). Hence
∀n ∈ {1, ..., N} ∃φnm, σ̂
n : ∀s ∈ SC ∩ S
n, φnm(s) = σ̂
n(s). (26)
Combining(24)-(26) and SA ∪ SB ∪ SC = Snc we get the result sought.
Given N , let G′2 be the complementary of G2 in G
′
1, i.e.,
G′2 := G
′
1\G2 = {G ∈ G
′
1 : ∃s ∈ S
N with c(G|s) = 1}. (27)
Summarizing to this point we have: (a) partitions G = G1 ∪ G
′
1 and G
′
1 = G2 ∪ G
′
2 and (b) G
′
2 is the
last class of graphs remaining to examine.
In search of positional profiles σ within G′2, a process of trial and error (coupled with some intuition)
led us to the following (and the last) partition of G′2. G3 is the subset of G
′
2 with graphs satisfying the
property that: at every state s with c(G|s) = 1, cop Ĉm(s) (m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}) can always effect
capture using σ̂m, no matter what the rest players do; G′3 is the complement of G3 with respect to G
′
2.
Formally, given N and Ĉm(s) (m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}) for all s ∈ Snc, define:
G3 :=
{
G ∈ G′2 : ∀
(
s with c(G|s) = 1 and σ−m
)
we have: (s, σ̂m, σ−m)→ Ĉm(s) capture
}
, (28)
G′3 :=
{
G ∈ G′2 : ∃
(
s with c(G|s) = 1 and σ−m
)
such that: (s, σ̂m, σ−m) 6→ Ĉm(s) capture
}
; (29)
where → (resp. 6→) means ”leads to” (resp. does not lead to).
The next proposition concerns graphs belonging to G′3.
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Proposition 3.15 Consider ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) with G ∈ G
′
3 and ε = 0. Then every profile σ is nonposi-
tional for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Let G ∈ G′3, s satisfying the conditions in (29) and Ĉm(s), T̂ (s) as known. Consider game
ΓmN (G|s, γ, ε). Starting from s, under every profile σ̂, Ĉm(s) captures at T̂ (s) and P−m’s loss is (1 −
ε)γT̂ (s) = γT̂ (s). Now, if σ−m is such that (s, σ̂m, σ−m) does not lead to Ĉm(s) capture, then, using σ
−m
P−m can force, either evasion of R, or capture by Cn with n 6= m, achieving in both cases a minimum
loss of 0 < γT̂ (s). Hence, there exists at least one n ∈ {1, ..., N}\m and state st ∈ S
n following s where
φnm(st) 6= σ̂
n(st), ∀σ̂
n ∈ Σ̂n and thus, every profile σ is nonpositional (and for all γ ∈ (0, 1)).
It remains to examine graphs in G3. As a first step, we aim to elucidate the form of such graphs.
The following lemma makes clearer the distinction between sets G3 and G
′
3.
8One graph in G′3 is a graph where the Petersen graph is bridged to a path. Then a state satisfying the condition in
(29) is the one where R is “crammed” between C1 and C2 on the path and it is R’s turn to move. Under CR-optimal
play R stays put in the first move and C1 captures right after. However, R can run into C2 straight ahead.
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Lemma 3.16 The following hold for any N :
If G ∈ G3 then: ∀
(
s ∈ SN with c(G|s) = 1 and σ−m
)
we have: (s, σ̂m, σ−m)→ Ĉm(s) capture. (30)
If G ∈ G′3 then: ∃
(
s ∈ SN with c(G|s) = 1 and σ−m
)
such that: (s, σ̂m, σ−m) 6→ Ĉm(s) capture. (31)
Proof. Clearly (28) implies (30). For (31), let s, σ−m satisfy the conditions in (29). If s ∈ SN then
(31) holds. If s /∈ SN , then starting from s (and for any strategy of the cops) the game will certainly
reach a state s′ ∈ SN (i.e., the robber will move at least once) by the following argument.
If the robber does not move at least once, then he is captured before he can move. This means
that: at s a cop (a) is next to R and (b) moves before R. But then by definition this cop is Ĉm(s),
which contradicts condition (29).
So, let s′ be the first state in SN that occurs starting from s, under profile (σ̂m, σ−m), where σ−m
is the same as in (29). Then s′ clearly satisfies (31) for this same σ−m.
Remark 3.17 Thus we see that for every G ∈ G3, each state s ∈ S
N ∩ Snc is such that, either (i)
c(G|s) =∞, or (ii) c(G|s) = 1 and s satisfies condition (30).
Next we show that, for every state s satisfying (30), there is a state s˜ which satisfies the exact same
conditions as s and differs from s only in that the capturing cop Cm is next to the robber.
Lemma 3.18 Let s = (x1, ..., xm, ..., xN−1, u,N) ∈ SN satisfying (30) for some Ĉm(s) and x
m /∈ N(u).
Then there exists s˜ = (x1, ..., x˜m, ..., xN−1, u,N) ∈ SN such that (i) x˜m ∈ N(u), (ii) c(G|s˜) = 1, (iii)
Ĉ(s˜) = Cm and (iv) for every σ˜
−m, (s˜, σ̂m, σ˜−m) leads to Ĉm(s˜) capture.
Proof. Let σ´−m be the profile where all players besides Cm stay put. Then, starting from s and under
(σ̂m, σ´−m), there will come a time where Cm reaches R’s neighborhood (because otherwise R could
stay put indefinitely and evade) and it is R’s turn to move. Let the respective state be s˜. First note
that s˜ has the required form; and x˜m ∈ N(u) i.e., condition (i) holds. Now, given (s, σ̂m, σ−m) leads
to Ĉm(s) capture for every σ
−m, this must be also true for any profile σ−m that copies σ´−m until s˜
occurs and follows any profile σ˜−m thereafter. Thus, (s˜, σ̂m, σ˜−m) leads to Ĉm(s) capture for every
σ˜−m and condition (iv) also holds. Conditions (ii)-(iii) follow immediately from (iv).
The following lemma reveals an important fact for graphs (as those in G3) satisfying (30).
Lemma 3.19 Let G ∈ G3. If s = (x
1, ..., xm, ..., xN−1, u,N) ∈ SN satisfies (30), then:
1. |N(u)| = 1 (i.e., u is a leaf) and
2. if {v} = N(u), then for all s′ = (y1, ..., yN−1, v,N) ∈ SN it is c(G|s′) =∞.
Proof. 1. Assume towards contradiction |N(u)| ≥ 2. We distinguish the following cases.
1.A. s is such that xm ∈ N(u). Then N(u) contains at least one more vertex z. There are two
possibilities.
(i) z is occupied by some cop Ci 6= Ĉm(s). But this violates the requirement that (s, σ̂
m, σ−m) leads
to Ĉm(s) capture, for every σ
−m since R can run into Ci on his first move.
(ii) z is not occupied by any cop. Moving some cop Ci 6= Ĉm(s) to vertex z we create state s
′′ ∈ SN
which differs from s only in Ci’s new location. Now we have (a) c(G|s
′′) = 1 and (b) letting
Ĉ(s′′) = Cn (where Cn may be Cm or Ci) then (given G ∈ G3) we must have that (s
′′, σ̂n, σ−n)
leads to Cn capture for every σ
−n. But (b) is violated since R can run into whichever cop is not
Cn (either Cm or Ci).
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Hence, if s is such that xm ∈ N(u) then |N(u)| = 1 and u is a leaf.
1.B. s is such that xm /∈ N(u). Then there exists some s˜ of the type described in Lemma 3.18 and we
return to Case A.
We conclude that if s satisfies (30) then u is always a leaf.
2. Assume on the contrary that v, the neighbor of u, is such that there exists s′ = (y1, ..., yN−1, v,N) ∈
SN with c(G|s′) 6=∞; then, since G ∈ G3, it must be c(G|s
′) = 1; therefore, s′ also satisfies (30). From
Part 1 then we have that v is a leaf; given u is also a leaf, it follows that G is the path P2; but this
contradicts G ∈ G3.
Corollary 3.20 Let G ∈ G3. Then u is not a leaf iff
∀s = (x1, ..., xN−1, u,N) ∈ SN it is c(G|s) =∞. (32)
Proof. The left to right implication follows from Lemma 3.19; the reverse from the fact that if u is a
leaf, then there always exist states s with c(G|s) = 1 e.g those where a cop occupies u’s neighbor.
The last two results lead directly to the following characterization of the form of graphs in G3.
Corollary 3.21 Let G ∈ G3 and u ∈ V (G). Then (i) either u is a leaf, in which case its neighbor
satisfies the condition in Part 2 of Lemma 3.19 (ii) or u is not a leaf and then condition (32) holds.
Remark 3.22 In other words, Corollary 3.21 means that, G3 consists of the graphs obtained by at-
taching to each graph G ∈ G2 an arbitrary (but positive) number of leaves. Some graphs in G3 then
are graphs like Petersen, or Dodecahedron to which some leaves have been attached to.
The following proposition concludes this study.
Proposition 3.23 Consider ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) with G ∈ G3 and ε = 0. Then there exists a positional
profile σ iff γ ∈ (0, 1N−1 ].
Proof. Take first any vertex u which is not a leaf. Then condition (32) holds. But (32) is the same
as the defining condition of G2. Hence, the same analysis as that in Proposition 3.14 leads to the
conclusion that: whenever the robber occupies a vertex that is not a leaf, every σ̂n ∈ Σ̂n is optimal for
each token n ∈ {1, ..., N} and in every game ΓmN (G|s0, γ, ε) for m ∈ {1, ..., N} and γ ∈ (0, 1).
Thus, we only need to examine cases where the robber occupies an arbitrary leaf of the graph. Fix
an m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} for the rest of the proof and consider ΓmN (G|s0, γ, ε). For the arbitrary leaf u of
G, let Sncu denote the set of all states s ∈ Snc where the robber occupies u. We now partition Sncu as
follows and consider for each set of states players’ P−m and Pm optimal strategies.
SA := {s ∈ Sncu : under (every) σ̂ the robber evades}
SB :=
{
s ∈ Sncu : under (every) σ̂, cop Cm captures (i.e., Ĉ (s) = Cm) at T̂ (s)
}
SC :=
{
s ∈ Sncu : under (every) σ̂, cop Cn (n 6= m) captures (i.e., Ĉ (s) = Cn) at T̂ (s)
}
.
Case A: s ∈ SA. For any s ∈ SA, if P−m uses any CR-optimal (cop and robber) strategies σ̂
n (n ∈
{1, ..., N}\m) he can force evasion of R for any strategy of Pm and get his minimum loss of 0. Given
P−m’s strategy, Pm cannot affect the outcome. Thus any strategy is optimal for him and so is any
CR-optimal strategy σ̂m. Hence
∀n ∈ {1, ..., N} ∃φnm, σ̂
n : ∀s ∈ SA ∩ S
n, φnm(s) = σ̂
n(s). (33)
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Let us pause here and consider the form of states s = (x1, ..., xN−1, u, n) (i.e., R occupies u) where
capture can occur under CR-optimal play. Let v denote u’s (unique) neighbor in G. Then it is not
hard to see that, under CR-optimal play, a capture can occur iff there exists at least one cop Ci, who
is (i) either already at v, i.e., xi = v, or (ii) he can cover v in case R moves there, i.e., either (ii.a)
d(xi, v) = 1, or (ii.b) d(xi, v) = 2 and Ci moves before R. In any other case R can evade using σ̂
N .
Furthermore note that, in all such states s it is c(G|s) = 1 and Ĉm(s) is the cop that is “closer” to R,
taking into account also whose turn is to move.9
Case B: s ∈ SB . Assume Pm uses σ̂
m for Cm and consider the options of P−m. It can be seen that,
depending on the state s, there exist only two possibilities, which partition further SB as follows:
1. States s ∈ SB1 : Cm effects a pure capture, for any strategy of P−m, and
2. States s ∈ SB2 : P−m can effect a joint capture, i.e., one involving Cm and some P−m cop tokens.
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If s ∈ SB1 , then under optimal play (in Γ
m
N (G|s0, γ, ε)) Cm goes straight towards R, while R stays put
and Cm captures at time T̂ (s). This describes the optimal strategies for Cm and R. The remaining
tokens Cn cannot affect the outcome. Thus, any strategy is optimal for them and so is any σ̂
n. Hence
∀n ∈ {1, ..., N} ∃φnm, σ̂
n : ∀s ∈ SB1 ∩ S
n, φnm(s) = σ̂
n(s). (34)
If s ∈ SB2 , then the exact same analysis as in case II.B. part 2 of Proposition 3.6 leads to the
conclusion that, whereas for Pm using σ̂
m is always optimal in ΓmN (G|s0, γ, ε), P−m, uses optimally
σ̂−m in ΓmN (G|s0, γ, ε) for all m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} and states s iff
γ ≤
1
N − 1
. (35)
Thus we have that iff (35) holds, then
∀n ∈ {1, ..., N} ∃φnm, σ̂
n : ∀s ∈ SB2 ∩ S
n, φnm(s) = σ̂
n(s). (36)
Case C: s ∈ SC . In this case P−m employing CR-optimal strategies σ̂
n for his cop and robber tokens
results to capture by Cn and his best outcome, i.e., a loss of 0. Similarly Pm loses anyhow so he may
as well employ σ̂m for his cop token Cm. Hence,
∀n ∈ {1, ..., N} ∃φnm, σ̂
n : ∀s ∈ SC ∩ S
n, φnm(s) = σ̂
n(s). (37)
Given SA ∪ SB ∪ SC = Sncv for every leaf v of G and relations (33), (34), (36) and (37), we have
that, iff (35) holds, then
∀n,m ∈ {1, ..., N} ∃φnm, σ̂
n : ∀s ∈ Sncu ∩ S
n, φnm(s) = σ̂
n(s), (38)
which completes the proof.
9That is, (i) either Ĉm(s) is already at v and for any other cop Cj that might be also at v, Ĉm(s) moves before Cj , or
(ii) Ĉm(s) is at distance 1 from v and for any other cop Cj that might also be at distance 1 from v, Ĉm(s) moves before
Cj , or (iii) Ĉm(s) is at distance 2 from v, no other cop’s distance from v is less than 2, and for any other cop Cj that
might also be at distance 2 from v, Ĉm(s) moves before Cj and Ĉm(s) moves before R.
10Note that, the expression (s, σ̂m, σ−m) leads to Ĉm(s) capture in (28) does not exclude the possibility of a joint
capture, which however involves Ĉm(s) as well.
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4 Conclusion
Our aim was to identify the cases of SCAR games ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) where, the generally nonpositional
trigger strategies Nash equilibria σ [3] are in fact positional. The current, exhaustive study regarding
the form and the values of of G, s0 and N, γ, ε respectively showed that positional σ profiles exist in
exceptional cases, as reflected in the following table.
ε G N s0 γ
ε ∈ (0, 1N−1 ] G is path P2 N = 3 s0 ∈ Snc
[√
ε
1−ε ,
1
2−2ε
]
ε = 0 G is path P2 N > 3 s0 ∈ Snc
(
0, 1N−1
]
ε = 0 G is path Pn (n ≥ 2) N ≥ 3 s0 s.t. cops on one side of the robber
(
0, 1N−1
]
ε = 0 G ∈ G2 N ≥ 3 s0 ∈ Snc (0, 1)
ε = 0 G ∈ G3 N ≥ 3 s0 ∈ Snc
(
0, 1N−1
]
Table 1: Cases of positional σ.
Clearly paths and the values of ε and γ play a major role. If ε > 0 where cops in the SCAR
game ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) have an incentive to cooperate, a positional σ exists only in the exceptional (if
not trivial) case where two cops chase the robber on the path P2 and only for these values of γ. In all
remaining cases σ are nonpositional. Also note that, games played on graphs in the class G2 are the
only ones where a path is not involved, since those in G3 can be seen as graphs in G2 connected to P2.
In addition to the above results, in the current study we have introduced the state cop number
c(G|s). This was crucial in our analysis for the following reasons.
1. Purely graph theoretical notions do not suffice because they do not take into account the number
of players. For example, if G is the Petersen graph, then: (i) if N = 3, G belongs to G2 (N) and
all ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) possess positional profiles σ (see Proposition 3.14), whereas (ii) if N = 4, all
ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) possess only nonpositional profiles σ (see Proposition 3.9).
2. The same holds for the classical cop number c(G). For example, the study of G(N ) (i.e., the class
of graphs with c(G) > N − 1) in Section 3.3.2, required a finer subdivision into six subclasses
defined in terms of c(G|s).
In a future paper we intend to present a refined analysis of the N -player SCAR game, concentrating
on subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) rather tnan NE. To this end, three elements of the current paper
will prove especially useful. First of all, we will use the state cop number c (G|s), because finding
SPE requires analysis of optimal play in every subgame ΓN (G|s, γ, ε), i.e., for every s and c(G|s) gives
important information for this. Furthermore, the subdivision of class G(N ) and the analysis of zero-sum
games ΓmN will also be useful.
A Appendix
Here we introduce the state s cop number cN (G|s) (or simply c (G|s), when N is taken for granted, or
is implied by the context). The notions presented here concern exclusively capturability and thus they
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depend only on the graph G and the state s to which they refer (and thus on the number of players,
their locations and whose turn is to move). Payoffs and initial states play no role. This motivates
us to define a CR-pregame11 Γ˘ (G) consisting of a graph G, N − 1 cop tokens and one robber token,
where move and capture rules are the same as in SCAR ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε), but no payoffs or initial state
are specified. These notions apply also to the games ΓmN (G|s0, γ, ε), including modified CR and to any
other game sharing this basic structure, since, for any initial state s and strategy profile σ, the infinite
history produced is the same in all of them.
First we define s-guaranteed capture profiles of k-th order, i.e. k-cops profiles which, when used in
Γ˘N (G), guarantee capture from state s, no matter how the rest N − k players (including R) play.
Definition A.1 A k-cops profile σ =
(
σi1 , ..., σik
)
(k ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}) in Γ˘N (G) is called s-guaranteed
capture profile (s-gcp) of k-th order iff, starting from s, the profile (σ, σ′) leads to capture for all strategy
profiles σ′ =
(
σj1 , ..., σjN−k
)
with {j1, ..., jN−k} = {1, ..., N} \ {i1, ..., ik} of the rest players.
Note that the definition of an s-gcp σ implies guaranteed capture by some (one or more) cops, but
not necessarily by one of the cops involved in σ.
And now we define the state cop number c (G|s) in Γ˘N (G).
Definition A.2 Consider the pregame Γ˘N (G) (N ≥ 2) and s ∈ Snc.
1. If a k-th order (k ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}) s-gcp exists, then the state s cop number in Γ˘N (G) is denoted
by c (G|s) and defined to be the minimum k for which such a k-th order s-gcp exists.
2. Otherwise c (G|s) =∞.
Example A.3 Consider Γ˘3(G) on graph G depicted in both Fig. 1.a and Fig. 1.b; note that c(G) = 2.
Suppose the current state is s1 = (3, 7, 5, 3) as depicted in Fig. 1.a with R having the move. It is clear
1
2 3
4
5 6 7
C1 R C2
1
2 3
4
5 6 7
C1R C2
Figure 1: (a) s1 = (3, 7, 5, 3), (b) s2 = (6, 5, 3, 3)
that, starting from s1, C1 can always ensure capture by going towards R and thus either effecting
capture himself, or forcing R to run into C2. Hence c(G|s1) = 1.
12 From s2 = (6, 5, 3, 3) however (Fig.
1.b) with R having again the move, both cops are needed to ensure capture and thus c(G|s2) = 2.
Finally we present the following theorem which establishes the connection between c (G|s) and the
classic cop number c(G).
11A similar situation occurs with extensive game forms with perfect information, that is, structures of extensive games
where players’ preferences are not specified [5, p.90]
12Note however that C1, R can move so that C2 cannot effect capture.
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Theorem A.4 Consider pregame Γ˘N (G) with N ≥ 2. Then
c(G) = K ≤ N − 1⇔ max
s∈Snc
c (G|s) = K ≤ N − 1 (39)
c(G) > N − 1⇔ max
s∈Snc
c(G|s) =∞. (40)
Proof. The complete proof will be given in a forthcoming paper. Here we give only the (short and
plausible) proof of (40) which is what we will use in this paper. Assume c(G) > N − 1. This means
there exists s′ in Γ˘N (G) where the N − 1 available cops do not suffice to ensure capture. Then by
definition of c(G|s) it is c(G|s′) =∞ and thus maxs∈Snc c(G|s) =∞. Conversely, maxs∈Snc c(G|s) =∞
implies there exists s′ such that c(G|s′) =∞ and hence N − 1 cops do not suffice to ensure capture in
Γ˘N (G) from state s
′. Thus c(G) > N − 1.
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